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FEA TURE ARTICLES
Hidden Costs to Homeowners: The
Prevalent Non-Disclosure of Yield Spread
Premiums in Mortgage Loan Transactions
By: Peter J. Hong, J.D.* and Marcos Reza**

I.

Introduction

Many borrowers receive mortgage loans with the assistance of
a mortgage broker.' A mortgage broker is a person who acts as an
intermediary between a lender and a borrower in a mortgage loan. 2
With the infinite variations in rates and terms of mortgage loan
programs, mortgage brokers often provide a valuable service by
helping borrowers select a loan that best meets their needs.
Furthermore, brokers typically assist borrowers throughout the loan
process by providing services such as completing required loan
applications, ordering appraisals, retrieving the borrowers' credit
report, and gathering all information required to complete the loan.
Oftentimes, borrowers may receive a better rate and term on their
loan program by going through a mortgage broker rather than if they
went directly to a lender. This is because lenders provide brokers
with wholesale rates and terms that are not available to the general

* Peter Hong, J.D. is a graduate of Loyola University Chicago School of Law
and currently practices law in Southern California.
** Marcos Reza works in residential loans in Southern California.
At least half of all residential mortgages are originated by brokers. Taiesha
L. Cantwell, Yield Spread Premiums: Who's Workingfor the Borrower? HUD's
Erroneous Regulation and its Bar on Plaintiffs, 21 L. & INEQ. 367, 369-70
(Summer 2003) (citing Bjustrom v. Trust One Mortgage, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1183,
1193 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (noting that "mortgage brokers occupy approximately
fifty percent of the market").
2

Id. at 370.
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public. However, while mortgage brokers provide valuable services,
3
the cost of those services are often undisclosed to the borrower.
Brokers often receive compensation by charging the
borrowers direct fees. For instance, a mortgage broker may charge a
borrower one percent of the loan amount as a loan origination fee.
Brokers may also charge other fees such as processing , document
preparation, and application fees. These additional fees are generally
referred to as "garbage fees" and are paid to a broker.4 Importantly,
garbage fees are not paid to a third party, such as an escrow agent,
insurance carrier, or appraiser in exchange for additional services that
are necessary to complete the loan transaction. Brokers typically use
garbage fees to generate income.
A lesser known manner by which brokers get compensated,
and the subject of this article, are yield spread premiums paid to
brokers by lenders. 6 While there are several factors that determine the
yield spread premium amount, they are generally linked to the
interest rate of a loan. Lenders provide mortgage brokers with rate
sheets that have various interest rates for a particular loan program.
Below is a hypothetical interest rate sheet for a thirty-year fixed loan:
Rate Cost
5.250% 2.000
5.375% 1.500
5.500% 1.000
5.625% 0.500
5.750% 0.000 (Par)
5.875% (.500)
6.000% (1.000)
6.125% (1.500)
3 Yield Spread Premiums: A Powerful Incentive for Equity. Theft, Ctr. for
Responsible Lending (CRL), CRL Issue Brief No. 11, at 2 (June 18, 2004).
4 See
Dian
Hymer,
What
Are
Garbage
Fees?
at
http://doityourself.com/houseclosing/garbagefees.htm.

' See id.
6 Payment to mortgage brokers in the form of yield spread premiums, in
addition to the mortgage refinance boom of recent years have made mortgage
brokers one of the highest paid professionals in the United States. John Hechinger,
Mortgage Brokers Benefit From Refinancing Boom, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (2005),
http://www.collegejoumal.com/salarydata/realestate/20030404hechinger.html?refresh=on (last visited Oct. 23, 2005) (stating that in 2004, the
average mortgage broker made $120,000, while owners of brokerage firms made an
average of $400,000).
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6.250% (1.875)
6.375% (2.125)
6.500% (2.375)
In general, a loan at "par" is the interest rate that the lending
institution will fund at 100 cents on the dollar.7 In our example, the
par rate is 5.750%. A loan above par is a loan that carries a higher
interest rate for which lending institutions are willing to fund more
than 100 cents on the dollar. Under today's standard practices, the
excess over par is paid to mortgage brokers in the form of yield
spread premiums. 8 The higher the rate is above par, the higher the
yield spread payment to the mortgage broker. According to the 2002
report of Professor Howell E. Jackson and Jeremy Berry, the average
yield spread premium is $1,848 per transaction, making it the most
important single source of revenue for mortgage brokers.
Yield spread premiums can be a great benefit for many
borrowers. Borrowers who do not have enough funds to pay for
closing costs out of pocket can use yield spread premiums to cover
those costs. Yield spread premiums provide borrowers with the
ability to obtain a higher interest loan and pay lower or no closing
costs up front. However, the majority of borrowers, regardless of
whether they can cover settlement costs out of pocket or not, receive
loans with yield spread premiums. 10 Most yield spread premiums
charged by brokers are either inadequately disclosed or not disclosed
at all to borrowers, even to those who can pay for settlement costs up
front." Therefore, yield spread premiums often result in borrowers
receiving loans at higher interest rates, which increases the overall
cost of a loan. The Center for Responsible Lending estimates that
excessive interest rates cost borrowers a total of $2.9 billion per

7
8

See Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage Co., 132 F.3d 692 (11th Cir 1998).
See id; The Illinois District Court found that a yield spread premium is a

payment from the lender to the broker for delivering a loan with an interest rate
above a pre-set par rate. See Watson v. CBSK Financial Group, Inc., 197 F. Supp.
2d 1118, 1120 (N.D. Ill. 2002)(stating that the amount of the premium is
determined by a rate sheet).
9 Howell E. Jackson & Jeremy Berry, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case
of
Yield
Spread
Premiums,
80
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/pdfs/january-draft.pdf (draft Jan. 8,
2002) (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
10 Id.
' Id.
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year. 12 This paper contends that this commonly used practice of
receiving compensation for raising interest rates is a breach of a
broker's fiduciary duty.
This article will begin with a discussion regarding a mortgage
broker's fiduciary relationship with his or her borrower. In particular,
a mortgage broker breaches his or her fiduciary duty to disclose all
material information by failing to adequately disclose the receipt of
yield spread premiums. Next discussed will be the federal legislation
designed to protect and inform borrowers in mortgage loan
transactions. Lastly, the authors will scrutinize current legislation and
contend that they fail to adequately protect borrowers against paying
undisclosed yield-spread premiums.

II.

The Origins of The Fiduciary Duty

The fiduciary duty is an equitable doctrine that emerged from
the Courts of Chancery. 13 The primary goal of the fiduciary duty is to
prevent those holding positions of power from abusing their
authority. 14 "Because of the dependency and vulnerability that was
involved in trust situations, equity imposed special duties on the
trustee known as fiduciary duties".'
Fiduciary relationships are recognized at law in a number of
situations. A fiduciary relationship has been held to exist in
relationships between a bank and its clients, a lawyer and his or her
clients, a doctor and a patient, a trustee and beneficiary, a director
and his or her company, and a mortgage broker and his or her
borrower.

III. Fiduciary Duty of Mortgage Brokers
The legal duty of the professional mortgage broker may be
12

Yield Spread Premiums: A Powerful Incentive for Equity Theft, supra note

3, at 1.
13 Tim Hammond, The Stolen Generation: Finding a Fiduciary Duty, 5
MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J. OF L., 2 (June
1998), available at

http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v5n2/hammond52nf.html (last visited Oct.
23, 2005).
14 Id. (citing Hon. Justice Owen, The State as a Fiduciary, Seminar on the
Recent Developments in the Law of Fiduciary Obligations, Law Society of
Western Australia Inc., Perth, 1 (1996)).
15 Id. (citing JRM Gautreau, Demystifying the Fiduciary Mystique, 68
CANADIAN BAR REvIEW, 1 (1989)).
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created by statute or common law.' 6 Courts have held that an agency
relationship exists between a mortgage broker and the broker's client
when the broker has a duty to act primarily for the benefit of his or
her client in matters connected with mortgage loans. 17 As an agent, a
mortgage broker holds a position of trust and confidence with respect
to his or her principal. Therefore, the broker is required to exercise
honesty and good faith toward the Iprincipal in all matters within the
scope of the broker's employment.
According to the Restatement of Contracts, "a fiduciary may
be liable for a mistaken assumption, known to be held or believed by
the unknowing party that remains uncorrected by the broker
thereafter."' 9 Furthermore, the broker cannot hold the borrower or
lender to the form or content of a written document if the broker
knows that it is incorrect, or if the broker knows that the other party
is mistaken as to the document's content or legal effect. 20 The broker
benefit and
is expected to correct such mistakes for the
2 1 principal's
liability.
for
grounds
be
may
so
failure to do
Currently, there are many types of mortgages available to
borrowers. For example, borrowers can obtain a traditional thirty year
fixed loan, an adjustable rate loan, or a negative amortization loan.
One of the major advantages of using a mortgage broker is that they
are knowledgeable of the various types of loans and can recommend
certain loans depending on a borrower's individual needs. However,
The California Department of Real Estate defines mortgage brokers as "an
agent for the purpose of arranging the home loan transaction. This relationship
imposes a legal duty on the broker to disclose to [the borrower] the material.. .facts
[borrowers] need to know about the loan. The broker has a duty of fairness and
honesty ....Cal. Dept. of Real Estate, Using the Services of a Real Estate Broker,
availableat http://www.dre.ca.gov/mlbrkr.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
17 See e.g. UMET Trust v. Santa Monica Med. Invest. Co., 140 Cal. App. 3d
16

864, 873 (Cal. Ct. App.1983); DeLeon v. Beneficial Construction Co., 55
F.Supp.2d 819, 827 (N.D.1Il.1999)(stating when one party undertakes to find
financing on behalf of another, a principal and agent relationship is created); See
Abbitt v. Gregory, 160 S.E. 896, 906 (1931); Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 266 S.E.2d 610, 620 (N.C. 1980)(stating that a broker is manifestly engaged in
the business of selling his services in procuring a loan which is most favorable to
the needs and of the potential borrower who, in turn has sought to obtain a broker
who can best represent his interests in securing proper financing).
18 2 New York Real Property Service, Brokers and Agents § 15:7 (1987).
'9 Restatement
20 See id.
21

See id.

(Second) of Contracts §161 (1981).
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the interest rates and corresponding yield spread premiums vary
between loan programs. This creates an inherent conflict as mortgage
brokers may receive a more favorable yield spread premium from one
loan program as compared to another. For example, a borrower may
be searching for the security of a fixed loan. However, a mortgage
broker may attempt to "sell" the borrower an adjustable rate loan
because he or she will receive a higher yield spread premium under
the adjustable rate program.
a. Duty to Fully Disclose
Mortgage brokers have an obligation to make a full and
22
accurate disclosure of the terms of a loan to their borrowers.
Brokers must disclose all material facts that may affect a principal's
decision, rights, and liabilities.
In Armstrong v. Republic Realty Mortgage Corp., a mortgage
broker arranged a three-tier conditional loan between the plaintiff and
a lender.24 When the lender refused to fund the third tier of the loan
under the loan agreement, the plaintiff asked the broker to contact the
lender to request that the lender either fully fund the loan or permit
prepayment of the loan without the contractual prepayment penalty.25
Instead, the broker urged the lender to increase the prepayment
penalty, reached an agreement from the lender to split the increased
penalty amount, and subsequently urged the plaintiff to pay a penalty
amount that exceeded the amount that the lender would initially
accept.26 The broker had a conflicting interest as prepayment of the
loan decreased the broker's ongoing loan service fees from the
lender. As a result, the court found that the broker violated its
28
fiduciary duty by not disclosing this adverse interest.
Similarly, the court in Realty Projects, Inc. v. Smith, found
that mortgage brokers hold themselves out to prospective borrowers
as loan experts who attempt to obtain a loan that meets their clients'

22

18 AM.

23

Id.

JUR. 3D PROOF OF FACTS

559, § 11 (2005).

Armstrong v. Republic Realty Mortgage Corp, 631 F.2d 1344, 1346 (8th
Cir. 1980).
24

25

Id..

26

Id.

27

Id. at 1349.

28

Id. at 1350.
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needs at the lowest practicable cost. 29 When a borrower indicates that
he or she needs a loan that falls within an amount on which
limitations are imposed on the broker's commissions, and the broker
suggests, without any economic justification, a higher loan amount
that exceeds the said limitations, the broker is required to inform the
borrower that he or she will be subject to substantially greater
brokerage fees. 30 Failure to do so amounts to a violation of the
broker's fiduciary duty of full disclosure to his or her principal.3 1
The court in UMET Trust v. Santa Monica Investment Co.,
found that a mortgage broker breached his fiduciary duty by failing to
advise the principal that his interest in property as a lessee in a saleleaseback transaction could be terminated upon abbreviated notice,
that the statutory right of redemption existed in the loan agreements
33
2
and that anti-deficiency statutes do not apply to sale-leasebacks.
The court also held that it is a violation of the broker's duty to
disclose if the broker affirmatively represents that sale-leaseback
financing provides the same flexibility as a conventional loan and
facts is
will accomplish the same result. 34 The duty to disclose such 35
not terminated by the principal's retention of separate counsel.
Accordingly, mortgage brokers have a duty to disclose to a
borrower that he or she is paying a higher interest rate than the broker
could have obtained for him on a particular loan without a yield
spread premium. Yield spread premiums frequently are not disclosed
on Good Faith Estimates. 36 The Real Estate Settlement Procedures
29

Realty Projects, Inc. v. Smith, 32 Cal. App. 3d 204, 210 (2d Dist. 1973).

30

Id. at211.

31 Id.

Anti-deficiency statutes protect buyers from personal liability if a lender
forecloses on property that has dropped in value. If a borrower doesn't make
payments and the loan is secured against the property by a recorded deed of trust,
the lender has the right to foreclose and take the property away from the buyer. See
e.g. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., §§33-801 - 33-821. (See T.1), Title 33, Chapter 6.1.
33 UMET Trust v. Santa Monica Medical Investment Co., 140 Cal. App. 3d
864, 873 (2d Dist. 1983).
32

34 Id.
35 Id.

A survey by the Justice & Integrity Project found that yield spread
premiums were disclosed on Good Faith Estimates less than one percent of the
time. Press Release, The Justice & Integrity Project, Mortgage Industry May Owe
Homeowners Billions for Overcharges (Apr. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.emediawire.com/releases/2005/4/prweb223707.htm (last visited Oct.
36
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Act requires the provision of a "good faith estimate of the amount or
range of charges for specific settlement services the borrower is
likely to incur in connection with the settlement as prescribed by the
Secretary ' 37 However, even when disclosed, brokers are only
required to provide an estimated yield spread premium. 38 Currently,
mortgage brokers may disclose a range of anticipated yield spread
premiums. 39 The Oregon Department of Consumer and Business
Services found a range of 0-3% acceptable. 4° However, the problem
with offering such a range is that it can be quite large. For example,
for a $300,000 loan, the estimated yield spread premium may be
between $0 and $10,000. Such a range does not provide the borrower
with a close estimate of the actual yield spread premium paid to the
broker.
b. The Intended Use of Yield Spread Premiums
The Housing and Urban Development (HUD) supports the
general premise of using yield spread premiums to assist borrowers in
paying closing costs associated with mortgage loans.4 ' In its policy
statement, HUD explained that yield spread premiums are a valuable
"option" that "permit homebuyers to pay some or all of the up front
settlement costs over the life of the mortgage through a higher
interest rate. ,,42 HUD found that this method of financing was
particularly suited for borrowers whose loan-to-value ratio already
reached the maximum permitted by a lender.43
However, brokers rarely describe yield spread premiums as
an
optional method for financing their settlement costs for a mortgage

23, 2005).
" 12 U.S.C. 2604(c); Or. Dep't of Consumer & Bus. Servs., Division of Fin.
& Corp. Secs., Mortgage Lenders Frequently Asked Questions: Disclosure of Yield
Spread Premiums
(YSP),
http://www.cbs.state.or.us/extemal/dfcs/faqs/
mortgage/ysp.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2005); 24 CFR 3500.7(a)(allowing for a
good faith estimate of the amount of or range of charges).
38 id.
39
40
41
42

41

See supra note 37.
Or. Dep't of Consumer & Bus. Servs., supra note 37.
See HUD Policy Statement II, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,052, 53,054 (Oct. 18, 2001).
Id. at 53,054.

See id.
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loan. 4 Most often, borrowers are told that they qualify for a certain
interest rate and are never made to understand that the interest rate is
higher than the par rate or that the higher interest rate is used to
finance a payment to the mortgage broker.45
Furthermore, despite HUD's support of using yield spread
premiums as an "option" for financing settlement costs for a select
number of borrowers with special circumstances, the overwhelming
majority of transactions involve yield spread premiums. 46 In fact,
Professor Howell Jackson and Jeremy Berry reported that yield
spread premiums are paid in eighty-five to ninety percent of all
mortgage loan transactions.47 The study further concluded that most
of the borrowers who were charged yield spread premiums had loans
that were less than the lending institutions' maximum loan-to-value
ratios.4 8 Therefore, the settlement costs in these transactions could
have been covered by increasing the loan amount.

IV. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) is a
consumer protection statute, first passed in 1974. 49 The purpose of
RESPA is to protect consumers from abusive practices that result in
unnecessarily high settlement charges, and to provide them with more
timely and accurate information about the nature and costs of the
Specifically, Congress passed RESPA to
settlement process.
and
referral fees that tend to increase the costs of
eliminate kickbacks
51
services.
those
RESPA mandates lenders to provide borrowers with

44 Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices: Abusive Uses of Yield Spread
Premiums: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
107th Cong. (Jan. 8, 2002)[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Prof. Howell E.
Jackson).
45 Hearings,supra note 44.
46

Jackson & Berry, supra note 10, at 73.

47

Id.
Id.

48

See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. §§ 26012617 (West 2005).
50 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a).
49

5'

12 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2).
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disclosures at various stages of a loan transaction. 52 More
specifically, RESPA requires a lender to disclose the costs associated
with the settlement, outline the lender servicing and escrow account
practices, and describe business relationships between settlement
service providers. 53 RESPA also prohibits certain practices that
increase the cost of settlement. 54 For example, Section 8 of RESPA
prohibits a person from giving or accepting anything of value for
referrals of settlement service business relating to a federally related
mortgage loan.55 It also prohibits a person from givin§ or accepting
any part of a charge for services that are not performed. Section 9 of
RESPA prohibits home sellers from requiring
buyers to purchase title
57
insurance from a particular company.
a. RESPA Required Disclosures
When a borrower applies for a mortgage loan, mortgage
brokers and/or lenders must give the borrower a Special Information
Booklet which contains consumer information regarding various real
estate settlement services, 58 a Good Faith Estimate (GFE) of
settlement costs that lists the charges the buyer is likely to pay at
settlement, and a Mortgage Servicing Disclosure Statement which
discloses to the borrower whether the lender intends to service the
loan itself or transfer it to different lender. 59 The Mortgage Servicing
Disclosure Statement also provides information about complaint
resolution.6 °

52

12 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1).

3 12 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1).
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2607- 2608.

14

" 12 U.S.C § 2607(a).
56 12 U.S.C. §2607(a).
12 U.S.C. § 2608(a).
58 12 U.S.C § 2604. The Special Information Booklet is required for purchase
transactions only.
17

'9 12 U.S.C. § 2604(c).
60 12 U.S.C. § 2604(c). RESPA does not provide an explicit penalty for the
failure to provide the Special Information Booklet, Good Faith Estimate or
Mortgage Servicing Statement. However, bank regulators may choose to impose
penalties on lenders who fail to comply with federal law.
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b. Disclosures at Settlement
At settlement, lenders are required to provide the borrower
with a HUD-1 Settlement Statement (HUD-1). 6 1 The HUD-1 is a
standard form that shows all charges imposed on borrowers 62 in
connection with the settlement. RESPA allows the borrower to
request to see the HUD-1 Settlement Statement one day before the
actual statement is issued at closing. 63 The settlement agent must then
provide the borrowers with a corn4pleted HUD- 1 based on information
known to the agent at that time. 6 The final HUD-1
shows the actual
65
transaction.
loan
completed
the
of
costs
settlement
Prior to the issuance of the final HUD-1, lenders are required
to create an Initial Escrow Statement. 66 The Initial Escrow Statement
itemizes the estimated taxes, insurance premiums, and other charges
anticipated to be paid from the Escrow Account during the first
twelve months of the loan. 67 It also lists the escrow payment amount
and any required cushion. 68 Although the statement is usually given
at settlement, the lender
has forty-five days from settlement to deliver
it to the borrower. 69
c.

Section 8: Kickbacks, Fee-Splitting, Unearned Fees

Section 8 of RESPA prohibits any person or
giving or accepting a fee, kickback, or anything of value
for referrals of settlement service business involving
related mortgage loan.7 ° In addition, RESPA prohibits
61

entity from
in exchange
a federally
fee splitting

12 U.S.C. § 2603(a) Also referred to as the "Closing HUD."

12 U.S.C. § 2603(a) The Closing HUD also shows charges to the seller if it
is a purchase transaction. Separate forms may be prepared for the borrower and the
seller. Where it is not the practice that the borrower and the seller both attend the
settlement, the HIUD- 1 should be mailed or delivered as soon as practicable after
settlement.
63 12 U.S.C. § 2603(b).
62

64

12 U.S.C. § 2603(b).

65

12 U.S.C. § 2603(b).

66

See 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17 (2005).

67

24 C.F.R. § 3500.17(g).

68

24 C.F.R. §3500.17(g).

69

24 C.F.R. §3500.17(g).

70

12 U.S.C. § 2607(a).
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and receiving unearned fees for services not actually performed. 7 1
In 2001, in response to a series of cases involving the
certifiability of RESPA yield-spread premium classes, HUD
reemphasized that a fact-finder cannot presume a payment to
constitute a kickback or referral fee, even if the payer of the fee is not
aware of the specific services performed by the recipient. 72 HUD has
consistently maintained that indirect fees, such as yield spread
premiums, benefit consumers who are unable to pay direct fees up
front to obtain home loans.73 However, HUD's policy is problematic
as it assumes that services are actually being performed in exchange
for the yield spread premium. In most cases, mortgage brokers are
paid directly by the borrowers
and indirectly through undisclosed
74
yield spread premiums.
Based on HUD's policy statement, courts should apply a twopart analysis in determining whether yield-Spread premiums are
reasonably related to work actually performed. First, courts should
look to whether goods or facilities were provided, or services
performed by the broker in the transaction. 76 Second, courts should
look to see if the total compensation is reasonably related to the total
set of goods or facilities actually furnished, or services performed.77
In 2001, HUD issued a policy statement expressly rejecting a court's
examination of whether services were actually provided specifically
for the yield-spread premium.78 Instead, HUD proposed that courts
should focus on whether a particular charge for 79
a mortgage deviates
from market rates in the area for similar services.
A broker might justify the payment of a yield spread premium
(YSP) including (1) taking information from the borrower and filling
71

12 U.S.C. § 2607(a).

72

66 Fed. Reg. at53,055.

73

66 Fed. Reg.at 53,504.

74

Cantwell, supra note 1, at 372.

See Bjustrom v. Trust One Mortgage, 178 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1194 (W.D.
Wash. 2001).
76 See id.
75

See id. at 1194-95.
78 See id. In its policy statement, HUD had adopted a two-part test for
ascertaining violations of RESPA Section 8: (1) whether services were actually
performed by the recipient of the challenged payment; and (2) whether the payment
was reasonably related to the value of the services.
77

79 Id.
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out the mortgage application; (2) analyzing the prospective
borrower's income and debt to determine the maximum mortgage the
borrower can afford; (3) educating the borrower in the home buying
and financing process; (4) collecting the necessary information and
other related documents necessary for the application process; (5)
verifying the borrower's employment; (6) orchestrating appraisals
and inspections; (7) providing disclosures to the borrower (i.e. truth
in lending, good-faith estimate); (8) helping the borrower clear up
credit problems; (9) keeping the parties in contact and up to date on
the status of the mortgage application; (10) ordering legal documents;
(11) assessing whether the property was located in a flood zone; and
(12) participating at the closing.80
While a payment to a broker who provides "no, nominal, or
duplicative work" would violate RESPA, it is not necessary, when
justifying the payment of a yield spread premium, that the lender or
the broker "tie the YSP payment to specific services provided."'" If it
is determined that the broker did indeed provide goods or services of
the kind typically associated with a mortgage transaction, then the
total compensation paid to the broker must be reasonably related to
the total value of the goods or services actually provided.
HUD's 2001 policy statement lists several factors that are
relevant when assessing the reasonableness of a mortgage broker's
compensation: (1) " fees paid in relation to price structures and
practices in similar transactions and in similar markets," and whether
the compensation paid to the broker is "commensurate with the
amount normally charged for similar services, goods or facilities"; (2)
"the level of difficulty involved in qualifying [and processing] the
applicant for particular loan programs," depending upon the
applicant's credit rating, employment status, levels of debt,
experience, etc.; (3) whether the mortgage broker is required "to
perform various levels of services under different servicing or
processing arrangements with wholesale lenders"; and (4) whether
the mortgage broker's total compensation is commensurate for "loans
of similar size and similar characteristics within similar geographic
markets." 83 "[C]omparison to prices in similar markets is generally a
64 Fed. Reg. 10,080, 10,085(C)(a) to (n) (Mar. 1,1999) (to be codified at 24
C.F.R. pt. 2500).
81 Heimmermann v.First Mortgage Corp, 305 F.3d 1257, 1263-64 (11th Cir.
80

2002).
82

Id. at 1263-64.

83

66 Fed. Reg. at 53,055.
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key factor in determining 4whether a mortgage broker's total
compensation is reasonable."8
A critical error in HUD's Policy Statement is its assumption
that mortgage brokers use yield spread premiums to "recoup the
upfront costs incurred on the borrower's behalf."85 In their report,
Jackson and Berry estimated that borrowers, on average, enjoy only
twenty-five cents of benefit for each dollar paid in yield spread
premiums. 86 This means that seventy-five cents for every dollar of
yield spread premiums paid to a broker serves to increase the
broker's compensation. On average, mortgage brokers earn $1,046.00
more on loans that involve yield spread premiums. 87 As a result, yield
spread premiums charged in the majority of transactions fail both
parts of the two-part test outlined by HUD.
A yield-spread premium, no matter what amount, is excessive
if not received in exchange for goods or services rendered.
Furthermore, a broker breaches his or her fiduciary duty to act in the
best interest of the principal when he receives and fails to disclose
payment for goods or services not rendered. Consequently, a more
appropriate inquiry would be whether the mortgage broker
adequately disclosed the yield spread premium, whether goods or
services were rendered, and whether the borrower agreed to the
payment structure.
d. The Individualized Approach to Fact-Finding by Courts
Consistent with the recommendations of HUD, courts have
been unwilling 88to set universal guidelines on what constitutes
reasonable fees. Rather, case law indicates that courts will treat
each loan transaction individually. 89 In O'Sullivan v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., the plaintiffs challenged certain fees charged by
attorneys that provided settlement services to Countrywide mortgage
customers. According to the plaintiffs, fees listed on the brokers'
HUD-1 disclosure statements as "document preparation fees" and
84

66 Fed. Reg. at 53,055.

85

66 Fed. Reg. at 53,054.

86

Jackson & Berry, supra note 10, at 102-16.

87

Id.

88 See O'Sullivan v. Countrywide Home, Loans, 319 F.3d 732, 736 (5th Cir.
2003); Barnes v. Republic Mortgage Ins. Co., No. CV 199-240, 2003 WL
17384544 at *6 (S.D. Ga. 2003).
89 See O'Sullivan, 319 F.3d at 736.
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"attorney's fees" were actually part of a fee-splitting scheme in which
Countrywide received payments from law firms in exchange for
business referrals. 90 The plaintiffs in two consolidated cases sought,
and the district court granted, certification of classes, including
approximately 80,000 Countrywide borrowers to litigate the question
of whether this practice constituted
an unlawful kickback or referral
91
fee arrangement under RESPA.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that while RESPA prohibits
kickbacks and referral fees, it expressly permits compensation "for
goods or facilities actually furnished or for services actually
performed., 92 The appellate court noted that, in the yield-spread
premium context, HUD policy statements had cautioned courts
against simply presuming that all transfers of value between
mortgage lenders and settlement9 3 service providers amount to
unlawful kickbacks or referral fees.
Applying HUD's 2001 statement, the Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court decision granting class certification on the ground
that, in at least some transactions, borrowers will have received real
value from real services performed. 94 "[I]ndividualized fact-finding
will be required for each transaction on the issues of what goods and
services [the law firms] provided to Countrywide, and
95 whether the
flat fee charged was reasonably related to their value."
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
reached a similar result in Barnes v. Republic Mortgage Insurance
Co. 9 6 That case grew out of a series of class actions where the
plaintiffs alleged that a number of the defendant's mortgage
insurance structures amounted to kickback and referral fee
arrangements under RESPA. 9 7 In particular, the plaintiffs challenged
structures in which lenders would take back risk from insurers in

90

Id. at 736.

at 737.
Id. at 738 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2607(c)(2)).

9' Id.
92

93
94

Id. at 740 (citing 66 Fed. Reg. at 53055).
O'Sullivan, 319 F.3d at 744-45.

9' Id. at 741.

Barnes v. Republic Mortgage Ins. Co., No. CV199-240, 2003 WL
17384544, at *6 (S.D. Ga. 2003).
97 Id. at *3.
96
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exchange for payments.98 . In these arrangements, which included
captive reinsurance, contract underwriting, and pool insurance, the
plaintiffs alleged that the mortgage insurers were in fact provided
services at a loss-thus conveying uncompensated value to
lenders-in exchange for referrals of lucrative mortgage insurance
business. 99 The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.100 Noting that "the central question is how we are to
measure value," the court concluded that the value of the restructured
insurance coverage could not be assessed on a class-wide basis.' 0 ' In
the court's words, "they are not susceptible to evaluation based on
generalizations about the abstract value of the structural
transactions." 02
As discussed, neither the legislators nor the courts have been
willing to set global parameters as to what constitutes reasonable
broker fees for services performed. Due to the lack of guidance on
what constitutes reasonable fees, the best protection afforded to both
borrowers and brokers is adequate disclosure, active negotiation, and
agreement of both parties.

V.

The Truth In Lending Act

The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) requires "meaningful
disclosure of credit terms" and is designed to protect consumers
against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card
practices. 0 3 TILA applies to individuals or businesses that offer or
extend credit when four conditions are met: (1) the credit is offered or
extended to consumers; (2) the offering or extension of credit is done
"regularly"[extends credit more than twenty-five times (or more than
five times for transactions secured by dwelling) per year]; (3) the
credit is subject to a finance charge or is payable by written
agreement in more than four installments, and; (4)0 4 the credit is
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.'
TILA requires brokers and lenders to disclose, in writing, the
98 id.
99 Id.

100 Idat*16.

'0' Id. at *8.
102

Id. at *9.

103

Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2005).

'04

15 U.S.C. § 1602.
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terms and conditions of a mortgage, including the annual percentage
rate (APR) and other fees and charges.' 0 5 The disclosure statements
should disclose the following: (1) identity of creditor; (2) amount
financed; (3) itemization of amount financed; (4) annual percentage
rate, including applicable variable rate disclosure; (5) total payments;
(6) payment
schedule; (7) prepayment penalties; (8) and finance
10 6
charges.
Yield spread premiums are problematic because the purpose
of a yield spread premium and its relationship with the interest rate
are often not disclosed to the borrower. 107 Although lender payments
to mortgage brokers must be revealed on government mandated
disclosure statements, the form of the disclosure is cryptic and does
not reveal the relationship between the interest rate charged on the
borrower's mortgage and the magnitude of the yield spread premium.
For example, the disclosure of a $4,000.00 yield spread premium on a
good faith estimate is typically listed among numerous other charges
and identified as "YSP of $4,000.00 POC".
This obscure form of disclosure is not sufficient to enable
borrower to make an informed credit decision. Some brokers and
lenders actually fail to provide any disclosure of the yield-spread
premium until the point at which the borrower signs the closing
documents which is a violation of TILA.
Under the TILA, all lenders are required to disclose the APR
of a loan. 10 8 The APR is a way to calculate the annual cost of loans,
taking into consideration loan origination fees, points, buy-down
points, mortgage insurance premiums, application fee underwriting,
and the other costs associated with securing a loan. 69 The APR is
generally higher than the note rate and
1 0 is intended to help borrowers
determine the "true cost" of the loan.
However, yield spread premiums are not included when
calculating the APR. Yield spread premiums, which are paid by the
105

U.S.C. § 1638(a).

106

15 U.S.C; § 1638(a)(1-15).

107

Cantwell, supra note 1,at 372.

108

15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(4).

109 What is APR for Mortgage Loans? Business Week Online, at
http://allbusiness.businessweek.com/article.asp?ID=3382&CenterlD=3891&CatID
.=3895
'10 76 AM. JUR. 3D PROOF OF FACTS 193, § 17 (2005).

" 1 Cantwell, supra note 1, at 381.
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lender, are considered indirect fees for borrowers because the
payment of premiums typically results in a higher interest rate to the
borrower. 112 This ultimately means that the compensation that the
broker receives from the lender is not included in the APR.

VI. Proposals for Instituting the Use of Retainer
Agreements as Standard Practice
Although federal laws attempt to provide procedural
safeguards to ensure that costs associated with mortgage transactions
are made aware to the borrower, they have proven inadequate. For
instance, RESPA requires mortgage brokers to provide borrowers
with a Good Faith Estimate of all costs associated with a mortgage
loan." 3 However, Good Faith Estimates do not adequately disclose
fees for two main reasons. As its name indicates, brokers are not
bound by any of the figures produced on the good faith estimate.
While binding brokers to a quoted interest rate is not practical since
interest rates can change on a daily basis, brokers are not even bound
by the quoted "garbage fees" which are directly controlled by the
broker.' 4 All too often, brokers adjust "garbage fees" in conjunction
with the yield spread premium amount received. Secondly, the
standard for what constitutes good faith as it applies to yield spread
premiums has not been established. As previously discussed, yield5
spread premiums may be estimated as 0-3% of the loan amount."
For a modest $300,000 loan, that is a range of $10,000.
A persistent problem with current laws is that they do not
emphasize the key area of law that governs all transactions between
mortgage brokers and borrowers: agency law. As stated repeatedly in
this article, brokers have a fiduciary duty to their borrowers.
Lawmakers should enact regulations that enforce that duty. This can
be accomplished twofold. First, mortgage brokers should negotiate
and disclose their compensation upfront through a retainer
agreement. Second, the services provided, and the cost for those
services, should be explicitly defined by a written agreement.
A retainer agreement confirms a mortgage broker's
112

Id. at 370.

113

12 U.S.C § 2604(c) (2005).

See 12 U.S.C. 2604(c). As stated previously in this article, RESPA only
requires brokers to estimate the closing costs associated with a loan. Therefore,
brokers are only required to provide a good faith estimate of garbage fees.
115 Or. Dep't of Consumer & Business Servs., supra note 37.
114
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commitment to accepting and handling the borrower's mortgage
needs, and simultaneously confirms the borrower's commitment to
compensate the broker for his or her services. Simply put, it confirms
the formation of an agency relationship. One of the main benefits of a
retainer agreement is that it allows all parties to negotiate the terms of
the agency relationship before any services are provided. A key
advantage for mortgage brokers is that they can incorporate a retainer
fee into the terms of the agreement. A retainer fee would significantly
reduce the amount of borrowers that begin the mortgage process with
more than one mortgage broker. Currently, mortgage brokers are
generally compensated only when a loan closes. Therefore, many
mortgage brokers are wary of providing hours of unpaid service to a
borrower who eventually closes a loan with another broker. This
creates distrust and makes the formation of an agency relationship
extremely difficult. However, once a broker receives a retainer fee,
the mortgage broker can feel confident that he or she will be
adequately compensated for the services provided. This will allow
brokers to focus on their fiduciary duty of obtaining the best
mortgage loan for the borrower.
A retainer agreement, in and of itself, does not adequately
protect borrowers. The compensation that the broker earns must be
negotiated and explicitly defined in the retainer agreement. In
negotiating a fee, borrowers should be wary of brokers who connect
their fees directly to the interest rate of a particular loan. The parties
should negotiate a fee depending upon factors such as the complexity
of the financial circumstances of the borrower, the difficulty of
obtaining a particular loan, and the broker's experience and expertise.
Borrowers can pay the mortgage broker in any agreed upon manner
such as a fixed dollar amount, an hourly charge, or even a percent of
the loan amount. By agreeing to a specific percent of the loan
amount, regardless of interest rates, borrowers can feel confident that
their broker will provide them with the best loan package available.
Yield spread premiums need not be completely eliminated. As
discussed in this article, yield spread premiums can be a valuable
option for many borrowers. However, brokers should be prohibited
from received yield spread premiums directly from lenders as
compensation. Rather, yield spread premiums should be credited to
the borrower. The borrower can then use the amount received in yield
spread premiums to pay the mortgage broker the previously agreed
amount.
Under the retainer agreement model, borrowers pay mortgage
brokers for services actually provided. Under the current yield spread
premium compensation system, mortgage brokers don't necessarily
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receive compensation for services they provide, but make their
money by placing a markup on the wholesale prices quoted to them
by lenders. Without argument, mortgage brokers provide an
important service, and their expertise is in high demand as the
mortgage industry has become increasingly complex. However, it is
crucial to establish that mortgage brokers are trained, and typically
licensed professionals who provide a service, rather than sell a
product. Once this fiduciary relationship is defined, borrowers can
feel confident that their agent will uphold this duty to broker the best
deal that meets the borrowers' needs.

